After leaving the coaching ranks, Lawson attended Yale Law School for two years until his funds were exhausted. 27 Thereafter, he moved to Washington D.C. in 1931, taking a job with the Supreme Liberty Life Insurance Company, and then enrolling in Howard Law School. 28 After graduating from law school and being admitted to the District of Columbia Bar in 1933, 29 Lawson opened his own firm with Alpha Phi Alpha brother and Cincinnati lawyer Theodore Moody Berry. 
II. LAWSON AND THE NEW NEGRO ALLIANCE
One of Lawson's significant achievements was his co-founding of the New Negro Alliance ("Alliance"). 31 At a time when the principal civil rights organizations (i.e., NAACP and National Urban League) employed a variety of strategies-lobbying, litigation, education, and negotiation-in their fight for civil rights, the social changes of the 1930's created a climate that fostered direct-action economic protests. 32 The Alliance, adopting this new approach, was one of the largest and most successful organizations to demonstrate grassroots economic protests in the civil rights context. 33 Events from the first third of the Twentieth Century helped facilitate the evolution from traditional methods of expression to the "Alliance-type" protests including: 1) the Great Depression, which compounded the already-existing economic disparities rooted in racial discrimination; 2) the Great Migration in 1915, which saw blacks leave their southern, rural communities for large urban "ghettos" where racial discrimination persisted; 3) the 1920s Black Renaissance, where the "New Negro" ideal of improving the status of blacks through cultural and intellectual achievement infused a race-consciousness in young blacks who rejected the anti-confrontational nature of older, traditional blacks; 4) the increasing use of direct-action techniques among communist and socialist groups; and 5) the passage of the Norris-La Guardia Act in March 23, 1932, which prohibited courts from issuing injunctions against "labor disputes." 34 The main impetus for the Alliance protests was the pervasive employment discrimination against blacks throughout the U.S. and in particular, Washington, D.C. 35 Black D.C. residents accounted for 29% of the District's total population, yet "black D.C." was regarded by many as a "secret city" -seemingly invisible to whites in the city, which systematically discriminated against blacks on the basis of race. 36 While they were among the best-educated blacks in the nation and constituted a large minority of its residents, they were largely restricted to menial jobs. 37 Despite the availability of a few menial jobs, 40% of black residents remained unemployed. 38 Several governmental entities such as the Civil Work Administration directly discriminated against blacks.
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The Alliance's beginnings took root in the summer of 1933 at Hamburger Grill, a white owned restaurant located in a black D.C. neighborhood. 40 On August 28th, its manager fired three of its black employees and replaced them with three whites, despite the fact that it relied heavily on its black customer base for business. 41 In retaliation, a group led by John Aubrey Davis (another D.C. activist) picketed the restaurant, causing the three terminated employees to be rehired the following day at higher wages and fewer hours. 42 On the heels of the successful rehire at the Grill, Davis visited Belford Lawson and Franklin Thorne at Lawson's law office to discuss the Alliance's future picketing strategy. 43 With that, the Alliance was formed and the movement to secure black jobs and higher wages began. 48 Despite this broad support, there were some early critics, who viewed the Alliance strategy as antagonizing and risky, carrying the potential to induce a white backlash. 49 The Alliance strategy was simple:
. . . [C]ollision with retail stores in black neighborhoods. Demanding that blacks be hired in proportion to their patronage, the Alliance conducted surveys to determine the volume of patronage and then confronted store officials with its demands. If store officials took "no definite action" within a reasonable period, the Alliance began door-to-door distribution of materials that explained the reasons for its next action, picketing. At the same time, it obtained pledges to boycott the store unless and until its demands were met.
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The Alliance's first project was an easy success. Lawson and Davis met with the personnel administrator of the Evening Star, the leading newspaper in D.C., to demand that the paper hire black paper boys, threatening a boycott otherwise. 51 The paper complied within three weeks.
52
Following its success at Hamburger Grill and with the Evening Star, the Alliance shifted its gaze to the grocery store chain, Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company ("A&P"). The A&P had recently opened a new store in D.C, but only hired white employees. 53 In New Negro Alliance v. Kaufman, the plaintiff, Harry Kaufman, Inc., owner and operator of a D.C. department store, filed a complaint against the Alliance for "unlawfully picketing and boycotting the store" and requested that the court issue a permanent injunction against the Alliance's picketers. 62 The district court issued a preliminary injunction, and Lawson immediately appealed.
63
On appeal, Lawson argued that because the dispute between the Alliance and Kaufman was a labor dispute, and the Norris-La Guardia Act prohibited courts from granting restraining orders and injunctions against such disputes, the lower court improperly granted the injunction. 64 The Court of Appeals dismissed Lawson's appeal on the grounds that it was premature. 65 Citing the D.C. Code, the court determined that the preliminary injunction was not a "final order, judgment, or decree, nor [was] it an interlocutory order whereby the possession of property is changed or affected."
66 As such, the court dismissed Lawson's premature appeal without prejudice. While the court refused to examine Kaufman on its merits, the following year, Lawson found himself fighting another injunction on behalf of the Alliance. There, the Alliance had targeted Sanitary Grocery ("Sanitary"), another operator of a large number of grocery stores in the D.C. area. 68 In accordance with its picketing plan, the Alliance requested that Sanitary employ blacks in managerial and sales positions in a new store it had recently opened. 69 After Sanitary ignored the request, Alliance picketed.
70 Following Kaufman's lead, Sanitary filed suit in federal court seeking a permanent injunction against the Alliance's pickets. 71 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted Sanitary's injunction, and Alliance appealed. 72 On appeal, Alliance again argued that the Norris-La Guardia Act protected their pickets from court injunction. 73 However, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower court's opinion, holding that the Norris-La Guardia Act did not apply because an employeremployee relationship did not exist between the picketers and Alliance. 74 In its conclusion, the court held that despite Alliance's commendable goal of improving black opportunities, it was not "justified in ignoring the rights of the public and the property rights of the owner of the business which they attempt to boycott." 75 Despite the setback in the Sanitary Grocery Store decisions, the Alliance continued to successfully picket elsewhere, using a variety of techniques, including mass mailings, petitions, and negotiations. 76 This success led to greater support from churches, the blackowned Washington Tribune, local and national leaders, homemakers, fraternities, and community groups. 77 Between 1937 and 1939, the local D.C. NAACP chapter had its charter revoked after a dispute with the national NAACP; 78 the Alliance was able to fill that void and increase its membership. 79 88 In its landmark decision, the Court looked at the language of subsection (a) of section 13 of the Norris-La Guardia Act, and held its definitions to plainly embrace the controversy, which gave rise to the instant suit, and classified it as a labor dispute, despite the fact that Alliance was not an employee of Sanitary. 89 In clear contrast to the lower courts, the Supreme Court emphatically stated that the Act was intended to cover labor disputes between interested parties and was not limited only to those situations involving an employer and its employee:
The Act does not concern itself with the background or the motives of the dispute. The desire for fair and equitable conditions of employment on the part of persons of any race, color, or persuasion, and the removal of discriminations against them by reason of their race or religious beliefs is quite as important to those concerned as fairness and equity in terms and conditions of employment can be to trade or any form of labor organization or association. Race discrimination by an employer may reasonably be deemed more unfair and less excusable than discrimination against workers on the ground of union affiliation. There is no justification in the apparent purposes or the express terms of the Act for limiting its definition of labor disputes and cases arising therefrom by excluding those which arise with respect to discrimination in terms and conditions of employment based upon differences of race or color. The Court further examined the Act's legislative history and determined that the purpose of the Act was, "short of fraud, breach of peace, violence, or conduct otherwise unlawful," to allow dissemination of information by those people interested in a labor dispute concerning the terms and conditions of employment. 91 It noted that peaceful and orderly dissemination of information by those defined as persons interested in a labor dispute concerning terms and conditions of employment should be at liberty to advertise and disseminate facts and information, as well as peacefully persuade others to concur in their views respecting an employer's practices. 92 Sanitary was thus a monumental victory: it established the right to picket by people unaffiliated with labor unions, 93 and it also secured Lawson's name in the annals of history as the first black lawyer to win a case before the U. 102 His client, Murray, was denied admission to the University of Maryland School of Law although he met all of its admission standards; he was denied admission solely because he was black. 103 The court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to extend to its citizens "substantially equal treatment in facilities that provides from the public funds."
104 Additionally, the court noted that while segregation is lawful, "separation of the races must nevertheless furnish equal treatment." 105 The court held that because Maryland did not offer a separate law school for black students, "[i]f those students are to be offered equal treatment . . . they must, at present, be admitted to the one school provided." 
V. LAWSON'S BROADER ACTIVISM
As the thirties waned, Lawson became more active in various organizations. In 1939, Lawson attended the third annual meeting of the National Lawyers Guild, an integrated alternative to the all-white American Bar Association. 133 In 1940, he was appointed General Counsel of Alpha Phi Alpha, assuming the post from business partner and fraternity brother, Theodore Berry.
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At the 1946 Alpha Phi Alpha General Convention, fraternity members elected Lawson General President of the fraternity. 135 The following year, Lawson gave a rousing keynote address that culminated in a stirring appeal to the Alpha ranks that would define the direction of the fraternity under his leadership:
The great decision of this generation of Alpha men is whether we shall, with every ounce of energy, with every dollar in our treasury, with every fiber of our mind and soul, deny the gi-127 SMITH, JR., supra note 30, at 567. 128 gantic conspiracy to preserve our segregated status quo, and destroy the mighty, monstrous mockery of human decency and dignity, the yoke of Jim Crow which hangs around our necks. To compromise is to evade the crucial, I call to action! Let us speak for the dawn.
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In 1948, Alpha Phi Alpha along with several other Greek societies formed the American Council on Human Rights. 137 The organization strived to extend human rights to all Americans by mobilizing nearly one hundred thousand members of the united fraternities and sororities. 138 Lawson was instrumental in the formation of this unprecedented cooperative effort among Greek societies and continuously lobbied for support for the organization throughout his presidency.
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In 1949, Lawson, along with the other members of the National Lawyer's Guild, drafted a letter admonishing Attorney General Tom Clark for investigating subversive influences among the law community and evaluating the fitness of certain lawyers to practice. 140 In the same year, Lawson reached out to his Alpha Phi Alpha brothers, requesting that they provide statements about their experiences of segregation on the United States railways as part of the ongoing case, Henderson v. United States. 141 Lawson thought such statements would be effective in conveying the "brutalizing and humiliating effects of this type of public humiliation" to the court. 142 I am delighted to know that definite progress is being made with respect to the validity and reasonableness of the dining car regulations of the Southern railway. In response to your re- Dr. Rayford W. Logan, officer of the United States Army in France in World War I, head of the Department of History at Howard University, world traveler, author of several books and member of the United States, National Commission for UNESCO, states that the regulation which compels him to eat behind a curtain or partition in a dining car is the most humiliating and degrading experience in his entire life in the United States. He further states that by training and temperament it is impossible for him to be a communist but if there were any one thing in American society that would lead him to communism, it is the impact of the insult to his dignity as an individual arising from the dining car regulations. I understand that Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity is prosecuting the case of Elmer Henderson v. United States, et al, in an effort to eliminate the vicious practices of Southern Railroads which require Negro passengers, who seek dining car accommodations, to be served at a table set off by curtain or partition. As one who travels extensively in the interest of the Government I wish to make some comments.
I have been exposed to these conditions many, many times and have never enjoyed equality in service at any time, while seated behind this curtain. Usually these four seats behind the curtain are occupied by whites because of overflow and congestion while there may be U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL 12:2 a single seat available elsewhere in the dining car. In the next place, the humiliating inconvenience and discomfort of such separate seats create mental anguish that often affects the gastronomical system. In addition, when these separate seats are not in use by whites during the early period of the meal, the dining car employees occupy them and leave them, usually, in complete disorder. Because of the discomfiture of such separate eating facilities on most Southern Railroads, many times I deny myself the privilege of a meal, rather than to engage in controversy with the Railroad employees in search of an available seat elsewhere in the dining car. I wish to advise that I have never eaten behind the curtain provided in dining cars which separate the tables where Negroes may eat from the tables where all other human beings may eat. Several times I have had meals served in the pullman car to avoid the humiliation. At other times I have been fortunate enough not to eat at all rather than sit behind the curtain. I have talked to a goodly number of my friends and acquaintances who travel a good deal and I am advised in varying details that to them the separation by the curtain does something somewhat different from the other jimcrow experiences they have had. In the first place, it seems so senseless that white persons should be satisfied to be served, by Negro waiters, food that has been cooked and prepared by Negro cooks, but refuse to eat in the same car with other Negroes unless there is some symbol of the inferior status imposed by circumstances over which Negroes themselves do not have control.
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These letters and others would ultimately be included in the petitioner's brief to the United States Supreme Court in Henderson. 148 Argued before the D.C. Circuit, Carr consolidated two cases seeking declaratory judgment regarding the actions of a school board pertaining to a black public school. 149 Lawson represented the second of two cases, an action by the PTA seeking declaratory judgment against the Superintendent of Schools and members of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia and injunctive relief, which would permit plaintiff pupils to attend junior high 146 Id. at 94-95. 147 See id. at 94-103. 148 In its complaint, the PTA alleged that the Board of Education's policies regarding the segregated schools were substantially unequal to the white schools-e.g., poor maintenance and "double shifts"-effectively reducing classroom time for all black students, and the arbitrary transfer of several students to other schools, and deprived them of due process protection. 151 The school district attempted to transfer Browne students to vacated elementary buildings which lacked important facilities and denied proper instructions in music, art, typewriting, home economics, woodshop, print shop, metal shop, and other vocational skills provided to white students.
152 Accordingly, the PTA prayed for an order of permanent injunction which would permit plaintiff students to attend the junior high school with equal facilities, equipment, and opportunities afforded to the white students. 153 Additionally, Lawson argued that segregation of the students, apart from equality analysis, was facially forbidden by the Constitution. 154 The court concluded that "social and economic interrelationship of two races living together is a legislative problem . . . and is not a problem solved fully, finally and unequivocally by a fiat enacted many years ago."
155 Acknowledging the debates before the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the court concluded that the actions of Congress to enact legislation which specifically provided for separation of the races in the schools of the District of Columbia, "conclusively support our view of the Amendment and its effect." 156 The court identified that the Board of Education of the District of Columbia is appointed by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and, thus, operates under direct mandate of the Congress. 157 As such, the court examined Congressional mandates regarding DC school policies and determined that Congress intended the schools to be racially segregated.
158 Furthermore, the court noted that the Supreme Court has "consistently held that if there be an equality of 150 the privileges which the laws give to the separated groups, the races may be separated."
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Having lost the argument that segregation on the basis of race is a per se violation of the Constitution, Lawson turned to the inequality of the facilities argument. 160 However, the court held that the "treatment accorded [the black plaintiffs] . . . would have been accorded them had they been white."
161 Furthermore, the court rationalized, "If the separation of the races in and of itself is not constitutionally invalid, such treatment, indiscriminate as to race, is not the unequal extension of privileges which violates constitutional prohibitions." 162 The same year that the D.C. Circuit handed down the Carr decision, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down another decision argued before it by Lawson, 163 but the origins of the second case began eight years prior. 164 On May 17, 1942, Elmer Henderson, a black United States citizen, traveled to Atlanta from Washington, D.C. aboard a Southern Railway ("Southern") train. 165 At 5:30 p.m., as the train proceeded through Virginia, a number of passengers waited to enter, and the car filled promptly. 166 At the time, Southern served meals to passengers of different races at different times. 167 However, the increase of passenger traffic in 1941 required the train to adopt a policy that accommodated serving both races simultaneously. 168 Southern issued a policy whereby each train would install a curtain in the diner to separate the black passenger tables from the white tables. 169 The policy further stated that in the event no black passengers arrived for service, the curtain would be pulled back and the two tables reserved for blacks would become available for white usage. 170 In the event that the tables became available and were occupied by whites, the next black passenger to arrive was required to wait until the black table was made available. 171 Essentially, Southern's policy permitted whites to be served ahead of blacks at the tables reserved for blacks if 159 Id. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 160 See id. at 23. 161 Carr, 182 F.2d. at 22. 162 Id. 163 the tables had already been opened (because no blacks showed up immediately when the diner opened) and there were no seats available at white tables. This was true regardless of how long a black person stood in line. To alleviate this potential problem, Southern allowed that if one race of passengers could not eat in the diner because another race was occupying his seat, the train would serve him in his passenger seat.
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At the opening of the diner the evening of May 17, no black passengers immediately arrived for service. 173 As such, the curtain was pulled back, and white passengers were allowed to sit at the end tables (those generally reserved for blacks).
174 When Henderson arrived, neither of the end tables were vacant (though seats were available among the whites sitting at the colored table), yet the steward refused to seat him among the whites. 175 The diner was filled continuously, with passengers from the line taking seats as soon as others vacated them, and Henderson was forced to wait. 176 The steward offered to serve Henderson in his seat back in the Pullman car, but Henderson declined service and waited to be seated in the dining car.
177 By the time the diner was removed by 9:00 pm Henderson had not been served. 178 The following October, Henderson filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission ("Commission") alleging that Southern had "unjustly discriminated against him in violation of the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA") and Article IV, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, by failing to furnish him with dining car service equal to that furnished white passengers. 179 The Commission granted Henderson a hearing and on May 13, 1944 heard oral arguments. 180 Relying on its examiner's recommendations and its own factual conclusions, the Commission ultimately dismissed the complaint, finding that although Southern violated the ICA by subjecting Henderson to "undue and unreasonable prejudice," 183 After dispensing with jurisdictional issues, the court discussed "the distinction between segregation and equality of treatment." 184 Citing Plessy, the court recognized that "it has been repeatedly declared by the Supreme Court that race segregation by State law is not per se an abridgment of any constitutional right secured to the citizen." 185 Further noting that by virtue of the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to prohibit segregation in interstate travel, but has not done so; choosing rather to limit Section 3 of the ICA prohibition to "undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage." 186 Furthermore, the court cited Mitchell v. United States, noting that the right to a particular accommodation does not depend upon the volume of traffic if such accommodations are provided, substantial equality cannot lawfully be withheld. 187 Because segregation of interstate passengers was not per se forbidden by the Constitution, the court directed its attention to whether ICA policy provided equal accommodations.
The court concluded that the service was not equal. 189 It based its decision on the fact that Southern's policy (approved of by the ICA in its previous ruling) " [did] not in fact require the setting aside of the two tables . . . exclusively for Negro passengers, but merely [said] that they are not to be used by white passengers until all other seats in the car have been taken."
190 Additionally, the court observed that the regulations failed to require the steward to take steps to ascertain whether there were any blacks on the train and that the regulations failed to consider the probability that a black passenger may not desire a meal as soon as he boards the train.
191 Therefore, the court concluded that Southern's policy did not afford that substantial equality of treatment between the races as the ICA and Mitchell require. 192 The court did not discuss the quality of the seats themselves-e.g., closeness of the black tables to the noisy kitchen, located behind an obvious curtain of separation, and limited to only two of the twelve tables-but relied solely on the fact that the tables were not exclusively reserved.
193 Accordingly, the court dismissed the Commission's order and remanded. 194 Following the remand, Southern adopted new regulations for its dining cars where one of the behind-the-curtain tables was reserved exclusively for black passengers. 195 Unlike the previous iteration of Southern's segregated dining experience, the "improved" policy provided for the possibility that white passengers would have to wait regardless of whether the black table was empty. 196 The Commission, in reviewing Southern's new policy, affirmed its prior findings in that although Henderson was subjected to undue and unreasonable prejudice, no basis for an award had been shown, and further found that the new regulations did not violate the ICA.
197 Accordingly, the Commission dismissed the complaint and Henderson again brought suit in federal district court to set aside the Commission's order. 
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The court agreed with the Commission and dismissed Henderson's complaint on similar grounds as in Henderson I. 199 First, the court reestablished that racial segregation of interstate passengers is not forbidden by the United States Constitution, ICA, or any other Act of Congress. 200 The court recognized a recent United States Supreme Court decision in Morgan v. Virginia, 201 noting that the Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute that required separation of the races in buses. 202 There, the Court distinguished state action and a rule of a carrier requiring segregation of interstate passengers, holding, "When passing upon the rule of a carrier that required segregation of an interstate passenger . . . we must keep in mind that we are not dealing with the law of a state attempting a regulation of interstate commerce beyond its power to make." 203 The district court distinguished Morgan on additional grounds because Southern's regulations apply only to service in dining cars, the regulations apply uniformly over the entire railroad system, and the regulation enforcement would not disturb the passengers by forcing them to change seats. 204 Additionally, the court agreed with the Commission's determination that the regulation allotting only one reserved table was adequate. 205 Based on statistical evidence, the court concluded that less than four percent of Southern's passengers were black, yet the reserved table allowed for eight percent of available seats in the diner. 206 Although the number of black passengers increased nearly two percentage points over the course of a year and was conceivable to become greater than eight percent, 207 the court quoted approvingly from the Commission's report that current action was unwarranted: "Should the indicated trend continue, substantial equality of treatment may require the reservation of additional accommodations for Negroes in the future." 208 Until such time, the court agreed that the the one Finally, the court observed that the principle of segregation was approved by the Supreme Court and that the curtains were merely a method of carrying it into execution and therefore for the Commission to determine. 210 Accordingly, it concluded curtains were a reasonable means to segregate. 211 The court devoted four lines of the Federal Supplement to dismissing the notion that the table located near the kitchen with its heat, noise, etc. was less desirable than any other seat. 212 Since neither the curtains nor the location of the tables were deemed inadequate or unequal, the court dismissed Henderson's complaint. 213 
